Muslim Women and Youth in the West: Background Paper

Chapter II: Islam in the West

With Muslim communities in Europe and the United States now extending beyond three generations and practicing Muslims having to negotiate modern life in the West, there has been much discussion of whether a unique version of Islam, different from that practiced in majority Muslim countries, is emerging out of the immigrant experience. This is particularly relevant in the context of women and youth.

In Europe, Muslim women are usually depicted either as symbols of tradition or as symbols of change, but North African women in France, for example, are proving that religious observance and progress need not be mutually exclusive:

Public opinion is preoccupied by the question of the veil and of forced marriage, while these girls are light-years away from all of that. . . . These Frenchwomen from the Maghreb are everywhere . . . in the universities, the civil service—as teachers in primary and secondary schools above all—in the administration, and even in the army, even without considering the private sector.⁶¹

This emergent “European Islam” also raises questions about new forms of religious observance. Can a new interpretation of Islam, rooted in the West, lead to more effective integration of Western Muslims in their adopted societies? ⁶² Are there useful comparisons with the incorporation of other religious groups—for example, Jews in Europe or Catholics in the United States—in terms of institutions and practice?

For decades after the arrival of large numbers of Muslims in such countries as France, Britain, Germany, and The Netherlands, the governments of these countries were either indifferent to or actively engaged in supporting their religious practice. Received wisdom among Western policy makers was that supporting religious practice would discourage radical politics and labor unrest and also possibly encourage immigrant workers to return home. ⁶³

Then, as it became clear that Muslims were becoming permanent settlers and citizens in the West, policy makers began to struggle with ways to accommodate Islamic practice. The most publicized conflicts have been those over dress codes for women in France, Germany, and most recently, Britain. However, other issues around Islamic practice have emerged in almost every Western country, from conflicts over ritual slaughter and burial grounds throughout Europe, to adjustments of the New York City parking calendar for Muslim holidays. For some countries that had already adjusted to other minority religions—to Jews and Catholics in Britain and the United States, and to Catholics in Germany—this struggle has been easier. For others, such as France, that have had more robust public policies of secularism (laïcité), closely held doctrines have come under question. Then–Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy has suggested revising the basic law of separation of church and state in France in order to integrate Muslim communities more effectively and give them a greater stake in society. ⁶⁴

Efforts to manage Islam in Europe have taken on a new urgency as radical Islam raises new concerns. Because many of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe have been perpetrated by young men born, raised, or working in the West, governmental authorities have recognized that the struggle against radicalism is also a struggle within Western Islam. For this reason, they have given increased attention to developing cooperative relations with Muslim community organizations.

Across Europe, new Islamic councils have been formed, modeled in many cases on institutions that were developed for other minority religions. Although these councils have focused on managing religious practice, they have also been important interlocutors in such crises as riots and terrorist attacks. This, for example, was precisely what the French government had in mind when it established the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM). During the widespread urban riots in November 2005, the CFCM did indeed play a useful (if somewhat marginal) role in helping to calm the tense environment. ⁶⁵ In this context, we will further examine two questions in detail. First, in what ways has Islam become a recognized religion in the West, and how has its relationship with European states developed? Second, how has Islamic practice adapted to the West?

Islam as a Minority Religion in the West

As Muslim populations in the West have become larger and more settled during the past four decades, the practice of Islam has simultaneously been influenced by secular forces in the West and has also become better established, as measured by the number of mosques.

A few mosques have existed in some Western countries for many years. The first significant mosque in Britain was built in Cardiff in 1860, and the Grand Mosque of Paris was opened in 1926. Officially, the Paris mosque was built as a gesture of thanks by the government to those Muslims who had fought and died for France in the First World War, but it was meant to serve the much broader purpose of building a strong French presence in the Muslim community. As a result, the French government subsidized the construction and maintenance of the mosque and combined it with a cultural center to conform with the 1905 law on the separation of church and state. ⁶⁶

Table 2 : Mosques and Prayer Spaces
Country	Estimated Number of Mosques/Prayer Spaces	Ratio of Muslim Population to Mosques/Prayer Spaces
United States	1,250	2,400
France	1,685	2,463
United Kingdom	1,669	959
Germany	2,300	1,304
Sources: Estimates from Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, p. 83; and from the Salaam Network, United Kingdom.

The Paris mosque notwithstanding, Muslim houses of worship were rare in Western countries until 25 years ago. Even now, there are proportionately far fewer houses of worship for Muslims than for Catholics, Protestants, or Jews. ⁶⁷ The number of mosques, though growing, remains relatively small in France, and is roughly mirrored in the United States (see Table 2).

Most of this growth has been within factories and housing projects that have small rooms not identifiable as mosques. Of the 1,685 Islamic prayer spaces in France, there are only 20 that can hold 1,000 or more worshipers, with another 54 that can accommodate between 500 and 1,000. In contrast, there are about 20,000 churches for a Catholic population of about 25 million. ⁶⁸

There is approximately the same number of prayer spaces in Britain as in France, ⁶⁹ and though they serve a much smaller community, they are larger and better established. The number of mosques in Germany is far greater than anywhere else in Europe, and in proportion to the size of its community, Muslims are far better served here than in either the United States or France. In the United States, however, the number of mosques is growing, as more affluent Muslim immigrants move from cities into the suburbs. In this way, Muslim immigrants are following the pattern of other immigrant groups in the United States.⁷⁰

The way Islam is organized in Western countries has generally followed the national models of previously integrated religious groups. Two factors have been important for understanding how this organization has varied from country to country: the historic relationship between church and state and the institutions that have been created for interaction between the state and organized religions. Thus, the organization of Islam in countries such as France, Sweden, and the United States, in which there is a separation of church and state, is different than in countries with established churches—Denmark, Norway, Britain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal, where official religion is linked to either the monarchy or to constitutional arrangements with a single church—and those with recognized, but not officially established churches, such as Germany and Belgium, where official recognition (and subsidies) are generally given to numerous churches that fulfill certain conditions. ⁷¹ However, even where there is a separation of church and state, the very nature of that separation may create privilege for some religions over others. For example, the French law of 1905 separating church and state gave the French state ownership of church buildings. As a consequence, the state maintains these older buildings, but cannot pay for the construction of new religious buildings.

Countries in the West have also varied with regard to the kinds of regulatory and consultative organizations they have created to mediate between church and state. Unlike Europe, wherein most countries have at least recognized if not sponsored religious organizations as intermediaries, in the United States, there has been no state sponsorship of religious organizations, Islamic or otherwise.

The lack of official sponsorship in the United States should not be confused with the political role played by organized religion there, particularly at the local level. There are well–known affiliations between the Catholic hierarchy and local political machines, especially those of the Democratic Party in the 19th and 20thh centuries. More recently the alliance between the Christian Coalition (which includes conservative Protestant groups as well as Catholic) and the Republican Party was a key factor in energizing that party and in the realignment of the party system in the 1990s. ⁷²

Moreover, the absence of state sponsorship in the United States does not mean that religious organizations are not accorded privileges.⁷³ Under specific conditions, they are granted a special tax–exempt status. Local governments also implicitly recognize religions by allowing absenteeism from schools and suspending parking regulations on their holidays. At the initiative of African American Muslims and in accordance with similar arrangements made for Jews after the Second World War, American schools and workplaces have increasingly been recognizing Muslim dress codes, dietary restrictions, and holidays since the 1970s. ⁷⁴

Officially there are no U.S. public funds available to construct mosques, but there have been documented instances of the use of local government power to help in this endeavor in Massachusetts and California. In Boston, the office of the mayor subsidized land acquisition for the construction of the mosque in West Roxbury.⁷⁵ In Fremont, California, the mayor and planning board helped a Methodist congregation and a Muslim masjid overcome homeowner opposition to find houses of worship. ⁷⁶

Likewise the separation of church and state in France has not prevented public financing of religious buildings or religious education, or the establishment of a representative Muslim council. However, the growing Muslim community has not benefited from the effective subsidization granted to established religions by the 1905 law, which transferred all churches and synagogues to state control, permitting their use free of charge. ⁷⁷

Since 1957, the state has also paid the salaries of teachers in religious schools under contract with the state. About 20 percent of French students attend Catholic schools, a percentage that has been stable for some time although the number of practicing Catholics has been declining rapidly. In contrast, the only Muslim school that now has a contract with the French government is on the Indian Ocean island of RŽunion. In metropolitan France, a small private girls’ lycée was founded in 1994 in response to the first wave of the foulard problem, after several Muslim girls had been suspended from state lycée for wearing headscarves a few years before. It now has 46 students. In total, there are now about 200 students in Muslim schools in France, far fewer Muslims than attend Catholic schools. By comparison, a quarter of Jewish students—about 30,000—attended Jewish schools in 2002. ⁷⁸ Most Muslim students in France attend public schools, where they comprise a large percentage of the student body in the “immigrant” suburbs of Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. Although the number of Muslim schools under contract with the state is expected to grow in the near future, the vast majority of Muslim students are likely to remain in public schools.

The 1905 separation of church and state had no impact on existing representative arrangements that were already in place with the Protestant and Jewish religious communities. These were used as a model when the government decided to reduce the foreign influence on the French Muslim population and create an Islam of France. The state–led effort began in 1997 and reached fruition in 2003, with the creation of the CFCM, the French Council for the Muslim Religion. The general problem for the French state was to bring together three diverse groups—the Grand Mosque of Paris, dominated by Algerians; the National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF), dominated by Moroccans; and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), dominated by Tunisians and close to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but financed by the Gulf Emirates. The government’s strategy was to attempt to isolate the UOIF, but when this proved to be impossible, then–Interior Minister Sarkozy negotiated a complicated arrangement that would assure the representation of the broad variety of interests that comprised the Muslim religious community in France, with the UOIF emerging as the dominant force. ⁷⁹ The council played a useful role in the massive riots in October–November 2005. ⁸⁰

While relations between the French government and Muslim religious leaders seem to have been improving, the comparatively easy relationship between Islam and the state in the United States declined after 2001. In reaction, Muslim organizations have increased their role in defending civil rights, much as Catholics and Jews had done in earlier periods. ⁸¹

Processes of incorporation in other parts of Europe have been more complicated, not only because of more stringent regulations, but also because Islam is last in line and is seeking incorporation in secularized countries that are less inclined to be sympathetic to religious practice in general, although Christian identity is still strong. ⁸² To a much greater degree than in the United States, however, official recognition is a precondition for numerous rights and benefits in Europe.

In Germany, for example, recognized religions have a right to government assistance through tax money. In addition, they have the right to run hospitals, nursing homes, and day care centers, as well as assistance programs of various kinds. They are also represented on government boards and are permitted to conduct religious education in public schools. The Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM), an umbrella association of Muslim groups formed in April 2007, aims to achieve official recognition of Islam so that Muslims in Germany can claim these legal advantages. ⁸³

Unlike Germany, Britain has an officially established religion—Christianity—and in that sense, the state is not neutral. Nevertheless, the barriers to recognizing Islam in Britain appear to have been easily overcome, although positive state aid plays less of a role than in Germany. Planning permission for mosques has not been a problem, and sites for ritual slaughter and cemeteries have been routinely granted. ⁸⁴ By the mid–1990s, 15 to 30 Islamic schools were established with private funds, and in 1998, the Labour government approved funding for two state–supported Islamic schools. ⁸⁵ By 2006, the number had grown to seven. ⁸⁶ Nevertheless, in the context of ongoing security concerns in Britain, it has become clear that any future growth of public funding for this purpose is likely to be highly scrutinized.

Religious Practice

It is useful to compare Islam in the West with other religions, both in terms of belief and identity, as well as observance. Identification with Christian faiths in Western Europe has been waning over the past several decades, but remains somewhat higher than actual religious practice. In major European countries, no more than 10 percent of the adult population attends church regularly, although a much larger percentage (60–70 percent in Britain and France) identify as Christian. Two decades ago, large numbers of nonpracticing Christians regularly attended church on major holidays; today, church attendance is limited to life–cycle events, but here, too, attendance is declining. ⁸⁷

As in Europe, Christian identification in the United States has been declining. In 2001, 76.5 percent of American adults over 18 (159 million people) identified themselves as Christian, a decline from 86.2 percent a decade earlier; this decline is identical to that observed in Canada between 1981 and 2001. ⁸⁸ The level of Christian identity in the United States is somewhat higher than in France or Germany (65–68 percent) and about the same as in the United Kingdom (72 percent).

As for observance, it has been estimated that about 40 percent of Americans attend church at least once a week, although some studies have argued that this is exaggerated and the real figure is half of that. ⁸⁹ Whatever the real figures, church attendance among Christians in the United States is significantly higher than in countries in Western Europe and the decline has been far slower.

Muslim populations in the West clearly differ in both identity and practice from Christians, but many of their religious characteristics are similar. In France, 59 percent of the population who originated in the Muslim countries of Africa and Turkey self–identify as Muslim (66 percent of North Africans), while 20 percent say they have no religion. This compares with about 65 percent of the French population that identifies as Catholic and 28 percent as of “no religion.” ⁹⁰ The basic pattern of regular mosque attendance is also similar to that of Catholics in France. A survey showed that 22 percent of those from Muslim countries in Africa and Turkey attended mosque at least once a month, compared with 18 percent of their Catholic counterparts. ⁹¹ Government services estimate that the figures for Muslims are considerably lower than that, even as low as 5 percent. ⁹²

However, recent data also indicate that, by various measures, commitment to Islam has been growing among younger generations born in France. Compared to a decade ago, more Muslims in the 20–29 age cohort agree that religion is “more important” in their lives, and far fewer declare the “no religion” option. In addition, as they have aged, formerly less observant young people declare themselves to be more observant. Finally, these patterns of religious commitment have been more pronounced among young women. This has not meant, however, that the French Muslim community is now more insular. There is little opposition to mixed marriage, for nstance, particularly for men. ⁹³

It is difficult to know to what extent this French pattern is typical of other countries in Europe. Data on mosque attendance are difficult to obtain and are often unreliable, ⁹⁴ but comparative estimates of church/mosque affiliation rates from country to country (where they exist) are often the same or about the same for mosques and Christian churches in Europe and in the United States. ⁹⁵ In the United States, mosque attendance appears to be lower among Muslim voters than the American average for church attendance, and the rate of nonattendance appears to be higher. ⁹⁶ Interestingly, though, more than two–thirds of Muslims in the United States claim to pray daily. ⁹⁷ This percentage is higher among women and increases substantially among young people. ⁹⁸ Levels of mosque involvement indicated by a 2006 survey are considerably lower than those indicated in 2001. ⁹⁹

Studies of various aspects of piety—from belief in God to prayer—show that expressions of piety are surprisingly high among European Christians and higher among Americans, and that this kind of piety is typically somewhat higher among Muslims. However, what seems to differentiate Muslim and Christian religious commitment most clearly in the West is the behavior of the younger generation.

Many studies have focused on the question of the re–Islamization of younger generations of Muslims born in Europe, and there seems to be little doubt that this process has taken root throughout Western Europe, ¹⁰⁰ as well as in the United States. ¹⁰¹ There was considerable discussion about this subject at the time that France passed its law banning the hijab in public schools in 2003, and much of it centered on the need for young girls to resist familial pressure to dress in traditional ways. There is now considerable evidence of pressure and even violence against young women within Muslim communities in France and other Western countries, ¹⁰² but anecdotal evidence suggests that this movement toward conservative dress also represents a generational rebellion against the West by young Muslim girls. It is unclear if this tendency represents a religious revival or an assertion of identity,¹⁰³ particularly since it has been occurring outside the confines of the mosque.

To reiterate, there have been clear indications that patterns of religious practice among Muslims in Europe have generally paralleled those of the larger societies in the countries where these communities have taken root. However, new patterns of observance among a younger generation of Muslims, often related to assertions of identity, have raised new issues in the process of integration.

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